In either
conventional or guerilla warfare absolute victory can only be achieved by
implementing both short-term and long-term strategies. Military operations that
are aimed at defeating the enemy forces on the ground, to gain control of
territory, could be considered as short-term strategies. Well planned civil
affairs operations to win the hearts and minds of the civilian population that
live in the areas coming under military control, could be considered as
long-term strategies. A lucid example of this reality is the Vietnam War, where
the Americans were ultimately defeated, even though they had all the resources
and the most sophisticated equipment needed, for modern warfare. The long-term
strategies of the American forces, through civil affairs operations, were
grossly inadequate to win over the hearts and minds of the people living in
occupied territories.
In
guerilla warfare Mao Tse Tsung compares terrorist to fish, and masses to water.
Just as much as water has to be removed to make it impossible for fish to
survive, masses have to be won over by the military to make it impossible for
terrorists to survive. Let us now consider how well this strategy was implemented
by the military leadership in Sinhela (
Their
attitude was similar to that of a man who thinks that a currency note is valid
if only one side of it is printed. The military operations on the ground that
were able to gain control of territory could not be sustained in most areas due
to lack of civilian support. Therefore the military had to withdraw from such
areas, allowing the terrorists to regain control of these areas once more. One
of the main contributory factors for such failures was the non-implementation
of well-planned civil affairs operations, to win over the civilian population.
Vavuniya district is the best example for a case study.
This district consists of four divisional secretariat areas. The Vavuniya Tamil
Division to the north and the Nedunkerni Division to the east are predominantly
Tamil. The Vavuniya South Division to the south is
predominantly Sinhalese. The Cheddikulam Division to the west is predominantly
Muslim. The whole of Nedunkerni Division, the Vavuniya North Division, the
Chedddikulam Division and even parts of the Vavuniya South Division were under
LTTE control in 1990. Under the able leadership of Late General Denzil
Kobbekaduwa, the Vavuniya North Division, Vavuniya South Division and the
Cheddikulam Division were totally liberated from the grasp of the LTTE. The
LTTE was unable to subsequently recapture the lost areas as a very
comprehensive long-term strategy in civil affaires was implemented in these areas
from inception, to win over the civilian population.
As opposed to this the Nedunkerni Division that was
liberated through the “Jaya Sikuru” operation around 1997, was retaken by the
LTTE with the withdrawal of the military from this area, in December 1999. One
of the contributory factors for the LTTE attack on the forward defence line and
the subsequent military withdrawal form the Nedunkerni area,
was the lack of civilian information and support. No long-term civil affairs
strategy was formulated and implemented in this area by the military
leadership, to win over the civil population. The results were catastrophic.
Therefore the defeat of a well-entrenched terrorist force
such as the LTTE cannot be achieved without both good short-term and long-term strategies.
The short-term strategy of only defeating the enemy forces on ground without a
well planed long-term strategy to hold the ground won will result in a loss of
men and equipment in a scale that a country such as ours can never afford. By
concentrating only on short-term strategies to defeat the LTTE, the security
forces have only succeeded in making the speculators such as Arms traders rich
at the expense of the general public. It is therefore time for the security
forces to rethink their strategy and to formulate equally good short-term and
long-term strategy, if they have any intention of militarily defeating the
LTTE.
Yours sincerely,
Anil Amarasekera.